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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUABTERLY
BILLS TO REMOVE CLOUD FROM TITLE-WITH REFER-
ENCE TO THE STATE OF THE AUTHORITIES
IN VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA.
By DAVI C. HOWARD*
I
R EAL ACTIONS, by which alone land was recoverable at early
common law, were of two kinds: actions droitural based upon
the plaintiff's title, and actions possessory which involved the right
of possessiQn.1 The writ of right was a typical action of the first
class and the writ of entry the most common possessory remedy.
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries both classes of real ac-
tions were almost wholly supplanted by ejectment,2-a purely pos-
sessory action, but one fitted to a feudal system where possession of
prbperty rather than title was chiefly safe-guarded.3 Only a few
real actions found a foothold in the American Colonies but the writ
of right was employed in several jurisdictions including Vir-
ginia,4 and writs of entry were adopted in Massachusetts and some
other states.5 One or two states converted the action of trespass
* Of the Charleston Bar; member of faculty of College of Law, West Virginia.
University 1914-1917.
14 MINOR, INSTITUTES, 420 et seq.
2SEDGWICK & WAITE, TREATISE ON TRIAL OF TITLE TO LAND, § 8 et 8eq. ;
3 ESSAYS Im ANGLO-AmERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, 615.
3Maitland, Mystery of Seisin, 2 L. Quart. Rev. 481.
'See Shaw v. Clements, 1 Call 429 (Va. 1798); Boling v. Petersburg, 3 Rand.
563 (Va. 1825) ; Taylor v. Burnsides, 1 Grat. 165 (Va. 1844) ; Liter v. Green, 2
Wheat. 306 (U. S. 1817) ; Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99
(U. S. 1830). Although the writ of right was abolished by Code of Va., 1849, c.
135, § 38, taking effect July 1, 1850, an action begun in 1847 was heard by the West
Virginia Court In 1885, Fisher v. Camp, 26 W. Va. 576; and in one case an action
on a writ of right seems to have been allowed in West Virginia without reference to
the fact that the action had been abolished. Genin v. Ingersoll, 2 W. Va. 558 (1868).
The writ of right had been simplified and rendered more effective by Acts of Va.,
1786, c. 59, and Code of Va., 1819, c. 118, but this writ along with the writ of entry
and writ of formedon were abolished by Code of Va., 18,49, c. 135, § 38, effective
July 1, 1850, and still in force in Virginia and West Virginia. Code of Va.,
1904, § 2759; Code of W. Va., 1913, c. 90, § 38. Following Code of Va., 1849, c. 135,
§ 2, ejectment may be brought "in the same cases in which a writ of right might
have been brought prior to the first day of July, 1850." Code of Va. 1904, § 2723;
Code of W. Va., 1913, c. 90, § 2.
SWells V. Prince, 4 Mass. 64 (1807); Higbee v. Rice, 5 Mass. 344 (1809);
JACKSON, REAL ACTIONS, 2.
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into a remedy for the trial of title,6 but, as in. England, ejectment
soon became the most important action for the recovery of real
estate.7 Since that time this form of action has been broadened
and strengthened by statutory enactment,8 and, in a few jurisdic-
tions, has given away to a wholly statutory legal action.9 Never-
theless, the writ of entry and the action in ejectment have left their
permanent impress upon the common law remedy for the recovery
of real estate which remains essentially possessory in its nature.
In the meantime the substitution of commercial for feudal stand-
ards has made title rather than possession of first importance and
has demanded an effective remedy for making marketable the title
of a plaintiff in peaceful possession of real estate. This need is
supplied by the equitable bill to remove cloud from title. In some
states this remedy has been superseded by a statutory suit to de-
termine title, equitable in form and very broad in its scope,10 but
in a majority of jurisdictions there remain many cases in which
adequate relief can only be given by a bill to remove cloud. Espec-
ially is this true in jurisdictions such as Virginia and West Vir-
ginia which cling rather closely to the common-law forms of action.
The jurisdiction of equity to remove a cloud from title seems
first to have been exercised by Lord Eldon. Prior to 1800 the
English courts of chancery had, in proper cases, compelled the
-cancellation of instruments, and this even in cases where there
was a defense at law," but, in the absence of grounds for cancel-
lation, it had been held that equity had no jurisdiction to issue
an injunction to remove a cloud from title to real estate. 2  Then,
6 State Bank v. South Carolina Manuf. Co., 3 Strobh. 190 (S. C. 1848) ; Moody v.
Woeller, 72 Tex. 635, 10 S. W. 727 (1889).
7 
SEDGWIcK & WAIrE, TREATISE ON TRIAL OF TITLE TO LAND, § 80 et seq.; 3
JEssAYS IN AXGLO-A3IEBcAN LEGAL HISToRY, 643.
8 See, 'for example, Code of Va., 1904, §§ 2722-2756 ; Code of W. Va., 1913, c. 90.
9 This Is the nature of the "action for the recovery of real estate" which has been
-established in many of the so-called "Code" states. See, for instance, Gen. Stat. Kan.
1915, §§ 7527-7529; Ky. Codes, Rev., 1900, §§ 6, 125; R. S. Mo., 1909,
if 2382, et seq.
10 Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall. 402 (U. S. 1867) ; Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15
(1883).
UWhittingham v. Thornborough, Prec. Ch. (Eng. 1690); Goddart v. Garrett, 1
'q. Cas. Abr. 371 (Eng. 1692) ; De Costa v. Scandret, 2 P. Wins. 170 (Eng. 1723) ;
'Sowerby v. Warder, (Eng. 1791), referred to in French v. Connelly, 2 Anst. 454;
French v. Connelly, supra, (Eng. 1794) (dictum).
2 In Welby v. Duke of Rutland, 2 Bro. Parl. Cas. 39 (Eng. 1773), a plaintiff
holding legal title and possession of property brought a bill to enjoin the defendant
from further claims to the property on the ground that such claims might create a
2
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for a time, it was held that equity was without power even for
cancellation in any case in which the law courts would not permit
recovery."3 Decisions of Lord Rosslyn and Sir R. Pepper Arden
(Lord Alvanley), however, established the rule that equity does
not lose jurisdiction to cancel an instrument by reason of the ex-
istence of a legal defense.14 In Byne v. Vivian, 5 Yes. Jr. 604,
(Eng. 1797), the most important of these decisions, Lord Rosslyn
cancelled a void annuity and a term for years given as security.
Sir John Mitford, (Lord Redesdale), then attorney-general, urged
in argument that there was jurisdiction on the ground that equity
alone could clear the plaintiff's title of the cloud caused by the
existence of the defendant's deed, but the court seems to have
ignored the suggestion for the decision treats the case as one for
cancellation simply. Byne v. Vivian was followed by Lord Eldon
in Bromley v. Holland, 7 Ves. Jp. 3 (Eng. 1802), a case involving
substantially similar facts. In his opinion Lord Eldon refers to
the suggestion made by Lord Redesdale and holds that "the colour
of title the deed furnishes as throwing a cloud upon title is one
of the circumstances that founds the jurisdiction." Eight years
later in Hayward v. Dimsdale, 17 Yes. Jr. 111 (Eng. 1810), Lord
Eldon cancelled a deed by which a bankrupt had attempted to
give a preference on the ground that "there is jurisdiction in this
court to order a deed forming a cloud upon title, to be delivered
up, though the deed is void at law," and there is a dictum to the
same effect in his opinion in Mayor of Colchester v. Lowten, 1 Ves.
& B. 226, 244 (Eng. 1813).
Mitford's suggestion that equity should act to remove clouds
from title has found little favor in the English courts. The de-
cisions of Lord Eldon, setting forth the doctrine, have been treated
as examples of cancellation merely, 15 and to this day the English
courts of chancery exercise no jurisdiction to remove clouds from
title."e In striking contrast is the reception given the doctrine in
cloud upon title. A demurrer to the bill was sustained by Lord Apsley (Barl Bathurst)
and his decision affirmed In the House of Lords.
13Ryan v. Macmath, 3 Bro. C. C. 15 (Eng. 1789) ; Franco v. Bolton, 3 Ves. Jr.
368 (Bng. 1797) ; Gray v. Mathias, 5 Yes. Jr. 286 (Eng. 1800).
11 Forster v. Davenport, (Eng. 1797), reported in Bromley v. Holland, 5 Yes. Jr.
610, 612, 615; Byne v. Vivian, 5 yes. Jr. 604 (Bng, 1800) ; Byne V. Potter, 5 Ves.
Jr. 609 (Eng. '1800) ; Bromley v. Holland, 5 yes. Jr. 610 (Eng. 1800). These cases
were followed in Koffman V. Cooke, 5 Yes. Jr. 623 (Eng. 1800) (Sir R. Pepper
Arden); Duff v. Atkinson, 8 yes. Jr. 577 (Eng. 1803) (Lord Eldon); Jackson
v. Mitchell, 13 Yes. Jr. 581 (Eng. 1807) (Lord Erskine).
1 Duncan v. Worrall, 10 Price 31 (Eng. 1822) ; Simpsqn v. Lord Howden, 3 My.
& Cr. 97 (Eng. 1837) ; Brooking v. Maudslay, 38' Ch. D. 636 (Eng. 1888).
16 The need for relief against a cloud upon title is obviously much less in England
3
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the United States. Through the medium of Mitford's own treatise
on Equity Pleading, 7 and through Maddock's Chancery,"' and
Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 9 each of which cited and followed
Mitford's text, Lord Eldon's decisions were brought to the at-
tention of American lawyers. Within a few years these cases
were supported by decisions of the leading jurists of the country.
In Hamilton v. Cummings, 1 Johns. Ch. 515 (N. Y. 1815), Chan-
cellor Kent decreed cancellation of an invalid bond on the au-
thority of Byne v. Vivian, and Lord Eldon's decision in Bromley
v. Holland, using language which has been cited in later cases as
justifying jurisdiction to remove cloud from title.2" In a ease of
earlier date Chief Justice Marshall, without citation of authority
sustained what was in substance a bill to remove cloud,2' and in
Peirsoll v. Elliott, 6 Pet. 97 (U. S. 1832), he held, on the authority
of Bromley v. Holland, that equity had jurisdiction to remove a
cloud from title. Justice Story upheld the jurisdiction in Briggs
v. French, 1 Sumner 504 (U. S. Cir. Ct. 1833). The result was
that within a few years jurisdiction to remove cloud from title
was an established form of relief in both federal22 and state
courts.
23
Jurisdiction to remove cloud from title rests upon grounds
wholly distinct from those which govern cancellation of instru-
ments. Equitable relief by cancellation is of ancient origin. At
common law, fraud, illegality, payment and many other defenses
could not be made to an action at law upon an instrument under
seal. The sole remedy was in equity which cancelled the instru-
ment" and thus prevented a recovery at law.24 When unsealed
because of the lack of a registry system. An Instrument adverse to the rights of
the holder of the legal title would not be among the papers shown to a purchaser and
would not, therefore, so much injure the property as If recorded.
. IlMITFORD, PLEADING & PRACTICE IN EQ., 3 ed., 104 n. c. MITFORD & TYLER, FL.
& PRAC. IN EQ., 223.
28 MADDOCx, CHiANCyR, 4 Am. ed., 226, citing MITFORD, PL. & PRAC. IN EQ.
19 2 ST RoY, EQ. Juis.,3. 13 ed., § 700, citing MITFOR. PL. & PRAC. IN EQ.
2 Chipmau v. City of Hartford, 21 Conn. 488 (1852) ; Munson v. Munson, 28 Conn.
582 (1859); Pettit v. Shepherd, 5 Paige 493 (N. Y. 1835); Scott v. Onderdonk,
14 N. Y. 9 (1856).
2LAlexander v. Pendleton, 8 Cranch 462 (U. S. 1814).
NCIark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195 (U. S. 1839) ; Parker v. Overman, 18 How. 137, 1
Hemp. 692 (U. S. 1855) (dictum) ; Orton %. Smith, 18 How. 263 (U. S. 1855)
(dictum).
2 Chipman v. City of Hartford, 21 Conn. 488 (1852); Leigh v. Everhart, 4 T.
B. Mon. 379 (Ky. 1827) ; Apthorp -v. Comstock, 2 Paige 482 (N. Y. 1831) ; Pettit v.
Shepherd, 5 Palge 493 (N. Y. 1835) ; Oakley v. Williamsburg, 6 Paige 262 (N. Y.
1837).
24 Ames, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defenses, 9 Harv. L. Rev. 49.
4
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instruments came into use these also were cancelled where the
-defense was purely equitable. Later the law courts gradually
acquired power to permit these defenses to be made at law but
equity, having once had jurisdiction, retained it as to defenses
arising out of the inception of the instrument, 5 though somewhat
illogically it ceased to allow cancellation for causes arising subse-
quent to the execution of the instrument. 8 In modern times the
jurisdiction for cancellation has been extended to cases where there
is a valid legal defense but the instrument is negotiable and there
is danger that it will be transferred to a bona fide purchaser.2"
Some jurisdictions also permit cancellation in any case in which
a legal defense exists but must be established by parol evidence
and is, therefore, liable to loss through failure of the memory of
witnesses or their death.28  In a majority of jurisdictions, how-
ever, an instrument cannot be cancelled merely on the ground that
a legal defense may fail through the loss of parol evidence,29 and,
in all, an instrument void upon its face is held not to require can-
cellation. 80 These decisions are rested upon the ground that such
instruments threaten no injury to the persons obligated because
there is always an adequate defense available at law. Neverthe-
less instruments subject to parol defenses and even those void upon
their face may, if they concern property, injure its value. The
z Depew v. Howard, 1 Munf. 293 (Va. 1810) (fraud); Morrison v. Waggy, 43
W. Va. 405, 27 S. B. 314 (1897) (fraud) -; O'Connor v. O'Connor, 45 W. Va. 354,
32 S. E. 276 (1898) (fraud) ; McGuire v. Ashly, 1 Rand. 76 (Va. 1822) (illegality);
Honaker v. Board of Education, 42 W. Va. 170, 24 S. E. 544 (1896) (illegality).
"Lewis v. Tobias, 10 Cal. 574 (1858) (payment) ; see also Gall v. Bank, 50
W. Va. 597, 40 S. E. 390 (1901) (payment).
w' Smith v. Aykwell, 3 Atkyns 566 (Eng. 1747) ; Thurman v. Burt, 53 Ill. 129
(1870) ; Gall v. Bank, 50 W. Va. 597. 40 S. E. 390 (1901) (dictum).
2 Patterson v. Smith, 4 Dana 153 (Ky. 1836) ; Ludington v. Tiffany, 6 W. Va.
11 (1870) ; Jackson v. Kittle, 34 W. Va. 207, 12 S. E. 484 (1890) (dictum) ; Mor-
rison v. Waggy, 43 W. Va. 405, 27 S. E. 314 (1897) ; Womelsdorf v. O'Connor, 53
W. Va. 314, 44 S. E. 191 (1903) ; Conn. Co. v. Home Co., 17 Blach. 142 (U. S. Cir.
VCt. 1879).
" Brooking v. Maudslay, L. R. 38 Ch. D. 636 (Eng. 1888) (insurance policy-
unseaworthiness) ; Erickson v. First Bank, 44 Neb. 622, 62 N. W. 1078 (1895)
(alteration) ; Venice v. Woodruff, 62 N. Y. 462 (1875) (nonperformance of con-
,dltion precedent) ; Carroll '. Brown, 28 Grat. 791 (Va. 1877) (dictum) ; Conn. Co.
'. Bear, 26 Fed. 582 (1886) (insurance policy--breach of condition to continue
temperate) ; Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Williams, 162 Fed. 301 (1908) (terms of
,contract altered).
50Gray -v. Mathias, 5 Ves. Jr. 286 (Eng. 1800); impsoa v. Lord Howden, 3
My. & Cr. 97 (Eng. 1837); Venice v. Woodruff, 62 N. Y. 462 (1875); Springport
v. Teutonta Bank, 75 N. Y. 397 (1882) ; Sheldon . Mayers, 81 Wis. 627, 51 N. W.
1082 (1892) ; Peirsoll v. Elliott, 8 Pet. 95 (U. S. 1832) ; Contra: Hamilton v. Cum-
mins, 1 Johns. Ch. 517 (N. Y. 1815) (dictum) ; Hoopes v. Devaughn, 43 W. Va.
447, 27 S. B. 251 (1896) (treating what was in substance a bill to remove cloud as
a bill for cancellation merely).
5
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protection of property from such injury is the basis of jurisdiction
to remove cloud and distinguishes that remedy from relief by can-
cellation. Grounds for the cancellation of an instrument may ex-
ist in a case in which there is also jurisdiction to remove cloud but
the latter relief may be granted in cases where cancellation is
unavailable.-3  Relief by cancellation, on the other hand, does not
depend upon the effect of the instrument upon property and the
question of possession is immaterial.3 2
Jurisdiction to remove cloud from title also differs wholly from
jurisdiction to grant a bill of peace. The common law rules gov-
erning joinder of parties sometimes make it impossible for a party
to obtain relief at law except by bringing many actions concerning
what is essentially the same subject-matter. In such a case to
protect a party from the annoyance and expense involved in bring-
ing or defending many suits equity gives relief by a bill of peace.
Jurisdiction is based upon the prevention of a multiplicity of
suits concerning a common question.3 3  Such a common question
may exist in a case where many actions are brought between the
same parties,3 4 or where there are numerous plaintiffs or defen-
dants whose claims depend upon the same set of facts or rule of
law.35  Formerly in addition to multiplicity of suits and a com-
mon question it was required that there be some additional ele-
ment such as a common interest in the defendants, 36 an exclusive
right claimed by the plaintiff, 37 or an independent ground of
equity jurisdiction.38 The existence of any of these elements is no
longer insisted upon by the more liberal courts.3 9 But whatever
5 lDull's Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 510, 6 Atl. 540 (1886).
32De Camp v. Carnahan, 26 W. Va. 839 (1886) (dictum) ; Hoopes v. Devaughn,
43 W. Va. 447, 27 S. E. 251 (1897) ; McConnell v. Rowland, 48 W. Va. 276, 37
S. E. 586 (1900); Mustard v. Big Creek Dev. Co., 69 W. Va. 713, 72 S. D. 1021
(1911) ; Jackson v. Cook, 71 W. Va. 210, 76 S. E. 443 (1912) ; Sayers V. Burk-
hardt, 85 Fed. 246 (1898).
= Pleasants v. Pleasants, 2 Call 319, 342 (Va. 1800) ; Randolph V. Kinney, 3
Rand. 394 (Va. 1825) (dictum) ; Stuart v. Coalter, 4 Rand. 74 (Va. 1826); 4
MINOR, INSTITUTES, 133.
3 Lord Bath v. Sherwin, Prec. in Ch. 261 (Eng. 1709) ; Bush v. Martins, 7 Leigh
320 (Va. 1836) (dictum) ; Nelson -v. Phares, 53 W. Va. 279, 10 S. D. 398 (1887) ;
Town of Weston v. Ralston, 49 W. Va. 170, 36 S. E. 446 (1900) ; Whitehouse v.
Jones, 60 W. Va. 680. 55 S. B. 730 (1907).
35 City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, 51 N. E. 907 (1898); Randolph v.
Kinney, 3 Rand. 394 (Va. 1825) (dictum) ; Bull v. Read, 13 Grat. 78 (Va. 1855);
Ambler v. Leach, 15 W. Va. 677 (1879).
3 How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, 1 Vernon 22 (Eng. 1681).
3 Mayor v. Pllkington, 1 Atk. 282 (Eng. 1737).
3 Tribbette v. Illinois Central R. Co., 70 Miss. 182, 12 So. 32 (1893) ; Miller v.
Wills, 95 Va. 337, 28 S. B. 337 (1897).
s9 Williams %. County Court, 26 W. Va. 488 (1865) ; County Court v. Boreman.
6
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its requirements, a bill of peace is essentially unlike a bill to
remove cloud though there are cases in which both forms of relief
may exist side by side. A bill of peace brought by a plaintiff
harrassed by many suits concerning the same piece of property is
properly called "a bill to quiet title," but this term is often ap-
plied to bills to remove cloud, a use both inaccurate and con-
fusing.40
Bills to remove cloud from title do resemble bills for cancella-
tion and bills of peace in that they belong to the protective or
preventive jurisdiction of equity and give relief against the im-
proper use of legal instruments and remedies. The object of a
bill to remove cloud from title is to declare void a claim which
interferes with the marketability of the plaintiff's title. The jus
disponendi is to-day one of the most valuable incidents of property.
Buyers do not desire to acquire law suits by purchase and adverse
claims of title, though invalid, cause property to become salable
only at a speculative price if at all.4' The jus disponendi is a
legal right but the owner of the legal title may have to wait in-
definitely for a legal remedy by which to vindicate it. In the
meantime there is an immediate and present injury to the prop-
erty against which equity very properly relieves.42 Even though
the instrument sought to be relieved against produces no im-
mediate dimunition in the selling value of the property there
always exists the possibility that in other hands or under altered
circumstances it will have that effect, 43 and against this possibility
of future injury to the owner of the legal title equity will give
relief quia timet.44  On the same principle equity will enjoin a
threatened act by which a cloud would be created. 41
Protection of the jus disponendi is just as important in the case
34 W. Va. 362, 368, 10 S. E. 490 (1890) (dictum) ; Blue Jacket Company v. Scherr,
50 W. Va. 533, 40 S. E. 514 (1901) (dictum).
Q Moore v. McNutt, 41 W. Va. 695, 24 S. E. 682 (1895) ; Whitehouse V. Jones,
60 W. Va. 680, 55 S. E. 730 (1907) ; Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15 (1882).
U Carroll v. Brown, 28 Grat. 791 (Va. 1877) ; Otey v. Stuart, 91 Va. 714, 22
S. E. 513 (1895) (dictum); Neff v. Ryman, 100 Va. 521, 42 S. R. 314 (1902)
Smith v. O'Keefe, 43 W. Va. 172, 27 S. E. 353 (1896).
QVa. Coal & Ir. Co. v. Kelly, 93 Va. 332, 24 S. E. 1020 (1896) ; Kane v. Va.
Coal & Iron Co., 97 Va. 329, 33 S. E. 627 (1899).
3Jackson v. Kittle, 34 W. Va. 207, 12 S. E. 484 (1890) ; Whitehouse v. Jones,
60 W. Va. 680, 55 S. R. 730 (1907).
'Stearns v. Harman, 80 Va. 48 (1885); Smith v. O'Keefe, 43 W. Va. 172,
27 S. E. 353 (1896).
45 Mr . McNutt, 41 W. Va. 695, 24 S. E. 682 (1895); Iguano Co. v. Jones,
65 W. Va. 59, 64 S. E. 640 (1906) ; Castle Brook Co. v. Ferrell, 76 W. Va. 300, 85
S. E. 544 (1915) ; Bradley v. Swope, 87 S. E. 96 (W. Va. 1916).
7
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of personal property as in that of real estate. Title to either
form of property is injured by the existence of adverse claims
which constitute a cloud. Personal property, more especially, is
rendered wholly unmarketable by any suggestion that there is a
dispute regarding the title. Bills to remove cloud should, there-
fore, be equally available to owners of real and personal property,
and by the better authority the relief is extended to both,48 though
there are several decisions holding that a bill to remove cloud
from title to personal property will not be sustained.47 As there
are situations in which no legal remedy exists by which title to
personal property can be made marketable, these decisions can be
justified only on the vague ground that equity extends a greater
protection to real than to personal property. In this day of com-
mercial standards such a distinction seems unjustified. The ques-
tion seems never to have been settled by decisions in Virginia or
West Virginia, though there are dicta each way.48
Relief by the removal of cloud from title is available only when
there is an injury to the jus disponendi for which the law affords
no adequate relief. There are, therefore, three requisites which
must be met to maintain such a bill: (1) The plaintiff must have
a substantial interest in the property beclouded. (2) There must
be no legal remedy by which title can be cleared. (3) The adverse
claim attacked must be such as to constitute a real cloud upon the
plaintiff's right in the property. These will be considered in turn.
II
It is a rule of equity that only persons having a substantial
interest in a controversy can maintain a bill for relief,49 and for
'
5 Eagan v. Mahoney, 24 Col. App. 285, 134 Pac. 156 (1913) (dictum); Stebbins
v. Perry County, 167 Ill. 567, 47 N. E. 1048 (1897); Sherman V. Fitch, 98 Mass.
59 (1867); New Haven R. Co. v. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592 (1858); Magnuson V.
Clithero, 101 Wis. 551, 77 N. W. 882 (1899). It has also been held that a bill to
remove cloud may be maintained where personal property Is in the possession of
officers of the law for purposes of evidence. Homrlch v. Robinson, 221 Mass. 308,
108 N. 1. 1082 (1915). Equitable relief has been refused, however, in cases where
the property was In the hands of a sheriff or marshall pending an action of replevin.
Thompson v. Verney, 106 Ill. App. 182 (1903) ; Jones v. MacKenzie, 122 Fed. 390
(1903). The 'effect of permitting relief in the latter instance would be to give
equity a right to assume jurisdiction In an action of replevin or detinue.
'7 Central Savings Bank v. Carpenters, 24 Col. App. 438, 134 Pac. 1007 (1913)
(adequate legal remedy); State a. Wood, 155 Mo. 425, 56 S. W. 474 (dictum)
Fonda v. Sage, 48 N. Y. 173, 184 (1872) (dictum).
's Bush v. Martins, 7 Leigh 321 (Va. 1836) (jurisdiction favored) ; Zinn v. Zinn,
54 W. Va. 483, 46 S. E. 202 (1904) (relief only If personal property is of peculiar
value).
4 Cope v. District Fair Ass'n, 99 Ill. 489 (1881) ; Smith v. Cornelius, 41 W. Va.
59, 22 S. E. 599 (1895) ; Bryant v. Logan, 56 W. Va. 141, 49 S. E. 21 (1904).
8
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this reason a bill to remove a cloud from title cannot be maintained
by a person having no present interest or title, legal or equitable,"
and the bill is demurrable if the plaintiff's lack of an interest in
the property appears on its face.5' In general, however, any
pecuniary or proprietary interest is sufficient to support a bill in
equity. 2  Legal title in the plaintiff is the most obvious example of
such an interest and there are broad statements in the cases to
the effect that a bill to remove cloud can only be brought by the
holder of the legal title,5" but a legal right in the property is clear-
ly sufficient. The nature of the interest is immaterial. It may be
an estate for years, for life, or in remainder, "4 title to the whole
or an undivided portion,5 an interest given merely as security as
a lien, mortgage or deed of trust,5 or even a purely incorporeal
right. 57  Nor is the source of the plaintiff's title material so long
as it is recognized as within the policy of the law. Rights ac-
50Parsons v. Newman, 99 Va. 298, 38 S. E. 186 (1901) ; Mathews V. Glenn, 100-
Va. 352, 41 S. D. 735 (1902) ; Baker v. Briggs, 99 Va. 360, 38 S. E. 277 (1901) ;
Austin v. Minor, 107 Va. 101, 57 S. E. 609 (1907) ; Barr v. Clayton, 29 W. Va-
256, 11 S. E. 899 (1886) ; Harr v. Shaffer, 45 W. Va. 709, 31 S. E. 905 (1898):
Zinn v. Zinn, 54 W. Va. 483, 46 S. E. 202 (1904) ; Stockton v. Craig, 56 W. Va.
464, 49 S. E. 386 (1904) ; Iguano Co. v. Jones, 65 W. Va. 59, 64 S. E. 640 (1909)
Lawson v. Pocahontas Coal Co., 73 W. Va. 296, 81 S. E. 583 (1913).
1 Smith v. Thomas, 99 Va. 86, 37 S. E. 784 (1901); Baker v. Briggs, 99 Va.
360, 38 S. E. 277 (1901) ; Meade v. King, 111 Va. 283, 68 S. E. 997 (1910) ; Harr-
v. Shaffer, 45 W. Va. 709, 31 S. D. 905 (1898); Holderby v. Hagan, 57 W. Va.
341, 50 S. E. 437 (1906) ; Roberts v. Gruber, 74 W. Va. 550 (1914) ; Kellar v,.
Craig, 126 Fed. 630 (1903).
52 Gee u. Prichard, 2 Swans. 402 (Eng. 1818) ; Dixon v. Holden, 7 Eq. 488 (Eng.
1869) ; Mesisco v. Guiliano, 190 Mass. 352, 76 N. E. 907 (1905) (dictum) ; Beck v.
Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1898); Brandreth i,.
Lance, 8 Paige 24 (N. Y. 1839) ; Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 A.
97 (1907) ; Evans v. Philadelphia Club. 50 Pa. St. 107 (1865) ; Bartlett V. Bartlett
& Son Co., 116 Wis. 450, 93 N. W. 473 (1903); Atlas Underwear Co. v,. Cooper-
Underwear Co. 210 Fed. 347 (1913). For a review of the cases on Equitable Relief
against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, showing that the courts seize upon
any property interest, however trivial, as sufficient to sustain equitable relief, see 29
Harv. L. Rev. 640.
63 Stonebunger v. Roller, 2 Va. Dec. 437 (1891); Neff v. Ryman, 100 Va. 521,
42 S. E. 314 (1902) ; Tax Title Co. v. Denoon, 107 Va. 201, 57 S. B. 586 (1907) ;
Meade v. King, 111 Va. 283, 68 S. R. 997 (1910) ; Wallace v. Elm Grove Coal Co..
58 W. Va. 449, 52 S. E. 485 (1906) ; Dewing v. Woods, 111 Fed. 575 (1901).
" German-American Savings Bank v. Gollmer, 155 Cal. 683, 102 Pac. 932 (1909)
(lessee for years) ;- Criner v. Geary, 89 S. B. 149 (W. Va. 1916) (life estate);
Morris v. Rosebeery, 46 W. Va. 24, 32 S. E. 1019 (1899) (widow with right to
dower) (dictum) ; Madigan v. Walsh, 22 Wis. 478 (1868) (widow entitled to
dower) ; Austin v. Brown, 37 W. Va. 634, 17 S. E. 207 (1893) (remainderman).
0 Peterson v. Hall, 57 W. Va. 535, 50 S. E. 603 (1906); Smith 'V. Linden Oil
Co., 69 W. Va. 57, 71 S. E. 167 (1911).
"Burlew v. Quarrier, 16 W. Va. 108 (1880) (trustee under deed of trust);
Danser v. Johnsons, 25 W. Va. 380 (1884) (trustee under deed of trust) ; Dudley 'v.
Browning, 90 S. E. 878 (W. Va. 1916) (vendor's lien).
57 Town of Weston v. Ralston, 48 W. Va. 170, 86 S. E. 446 (1901) (right of way).
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quired by adverse possession will sustain a bill to remove cloud
since, by lapse of time, the plaintiff has ceased to be a disseisor-
and become owner of the legal title.58
The presence of minerals in real estate gives rise to many legal
interests which are peculiarly within the protection of an equi-
table bill to remove cloud. In all jurisdictions title to coal or ore
underlying the soil may be separated from title to the surface by
a proper conveyance, 9 and in such a ease the owner of the sur-
face ° and the owner of the coal or ore6' each has a vested corporeal
estate sufficient to support a bill to remove cloud from his respec-
tive interests. Because of their fugitive nature oil and gas are
not, like other minerals, a part of the realty in place but are some-
what analogous to animals ferae naturae,6 2 or percolating waters,a
both of which move from place to place and may be reduced to
possession by any one of several owners of the surface, differing
from animals ferae naturae in that, while animals ferae naturae
are the absolute property of the state and subject to complete con-
trol by it, oil and gas are the property of the various owners of the
surface and subject to state control only within the limits govern-
ing other property rights.6 4 Since these minerals are not a fixed
part of the realty an owner of the surface has no vested right to
the particular oil and gas underlying his tract. Nevertheless, the
courts of Kansas and West Virginia have held that actual title
to oil and gas may be conveyed by a grant in fee-simple, separat-
6 Torrent Co. v. Mobile, 101 Ala. 559, 14 So. 557 (1893) ; McCormack v. Silsby,
82 Cal. 72, 22 Pac. 824 (1890); Tracy v. Newton, 57 Ia. 210, 10 N. W. 636
(1881) ; Gardner v. Terry, 99 Mo. 523, 12 S. W. 888 (1889); Watson i,. Jeffrey,
39 N. J. Eq. 62 (1884) ; Taylor v. Hedrick, 110 Va. 461, 66 S. E. 65 (1909);
Pendleton v. Alexander, 8 Cranch 462 (U. S. 1814).
69 Barrett v,. Coal Co., 70 Kan. 649, 79 Pac. 150 (1905) ; Lillibridge v. Lacka-
wanna Coal Co., 143 Pa. St., 293, 22 At. 1035 (1891); Morrison v. American
Ass'n., 110 Va. 91, 65 S. E. 469 (1909); Low v. County Court, 27 W. Va. 785
(1886) ; Wallace v. Elm Grove Coal Co., 58 W. Va. 449, 52 S. B. 485 (1906).
COSteinman v. Vicars, 99 Va. 595, 39 S. B. 227 (1901).
(aVa. Iron Co. v. Roberts, 103 Va. 661, 49 S. E. 984 (1905). In Comley V. Ford,
65 W. Va. 429, 64 S. E. 447 (1909), the court recognizes that the owner of the
coal under a tract of land possesses a vested corporeal estate in the property out of
which he may create an estate for years.
a Brown v. Vandergrift, 80 Pa. St. 142 (1874) ; Westmoreland Co. v. Dewitt, 130
Pa. St. 235, 18 Atl. 724 (1889).
6 Petroleum Company v. Transportation Company, 28 W. Va. 210 (1886); Wil.
llamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231, 19 S. E. 436 (1894) ; Hall v. Vernon, 47 W. Va,.
295, 296, 300, 34 S. E. 764 (1900) ; Brown -v. Spilman, 155 U. S. 665 (1894).
"State v. Ohio Fuel Oil Company, 150 Ind. 21, 49 N. E. 809, 177 U. S. 190.
(1899) ; West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229 (1910) ; Kansas Naturalj
Gas Co. . Haskell, 172 Fed. 545 (1909).
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ing the title in these minerals from title to the surface. 5 In
Pennsylvania and a majority of the states where the question has
arisen, more consideration is given to the fugitive nature of oil
and gas, and, although an absolute conveyance gives the grantee
all the rights of the grantor in the oil and gas underlying his
property, it is recognized that this interest is limited to an ex-
clusive right to explore for and remove oil and .gas if found. 8
When, as in Kansas and West Virginia, a conveyance of oil and
gas separates title in these products from title to the surface, a
grantee of the oil and gas has an estate in the land analogous to
the interest possessed by a grantee of coal or ore and may main-
tain a bill to remove a cloud upon this interest. 7 In jurisdictions
where the rule of the Pennsylvania court prevails the rights of a
person who has reserved or been granted an exclusive interest in
oil and gas, apart from the ownership of the surface, are less easy
to define. Such a person has a vested right to remove oil and gas
if found and, as an incident of this right, an exclusive right to
explore upon the property and drill for these minerals. The right
to remove oil and gas when found would seem to be incorporeal;
the right to possession for purposes of exploration is, on the other
hand, an estate, a corporeal interest in the land itself. Together
these rights constitute a substantial interest in the property which
would seem sufficient to support a bill to remove cloud. 8  It is
submitted that under either the West Virginia or the Pennsylvania
rule the owner of the surface should be allowed to bring a bill to
-remove a cloud upon his interest even though he has no right to
the oil and gas underlying his property but no reported case seems
to have involved this question.
Additional complications as to the legal rights in property arise
06Moore v. Griffin, 72 Kan. 1U4 (1905) ; Wilson v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826, 28 S. E.
781 (1896) ; Hall v. Vernon, 47 W. Va. 295, 34 S. E. 764 (1899) ; Preston v. White,
57 W. Va. 278, 50 S. E. 236 (1906).
0 Osborn v. Arkansas Oil & Gas Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S. W. 122 (1911);
Watford Oil & Gas Company v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53 (1908); Frank
Oil Co. v. Belleview Gas & Oil Co., 29 Okla. 719, 119 Pac. 260 (1911); Appeal of
Stoughton, 88 Pa. St. 198 (18780 ; Greenburg Fuel Co. v. Nat. Gas Co., 162 Pa. St.
78, 29 AtI. 274 (1894) ; Hutton v. Carnegie Gas Co., 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 376 (1912).
87Peterson v. Hall, 57 W. Va. 535, 50 S. E. 603 (1906); Smith v. Linden Oil
Co., 69 W. Va. 57, 71 S. E. 167 (1911) ; contra: Zinn v. Zinn, 54 W. Va. 483, 46
S. E. 204 (1904), overruled by Peterson v. Hall, supra.
O Search through the digests has failed to reveal a case outside of West Vir-
ginia where a bill to remove cloud has been brought by an owner of oil and gas
separated from title to the surface. Since, as appears below, this is the only remedy
available to such a person, there must be many such cases in the jurisdictions where
rights in oil and gas are frequently in litigation.
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when it is leased for the purpose of mining and removing the
minerals underlying it. In Pennsylvania the courts are very
ready to construe a lease of coal or ore property to be an absolute
sale and conveyance of the coal in place, 9 but in other jurisdic-
tions unless the intent to make an absolute grant of these minerals
clearly appears, a lease of coal or ore property, whether on a rental
or royalty basis, conveys no title in the coal or ore.70 The lessee
has, however, an exclusive right to take possession of the property
for the purpose of exploring for and removing such coal or ore
as may be found. The right to remove coal or ore seems to be
incorporeal-a mere right to convert realty into personal property.
The right of possession for purposes of exploration and removal
is, on the other hand, corporeal. Under the usual lease for a
term of years it is a vested estate for years in the land, a chattel
real.71  These interests are sufficient to support the right of a
lessee of coal or ore property to maintain a bill to remove cloud.
7 2
The lessor, on his part, has a reversionary interest in the property
subject to the expiration, surrender or forfeiture of the lease and
this has been held to justify relief by the removal of cloud.73 When
such a lessor has no rights in the surface but by severance is
owner of only the coal or ore a more difficult problem is presented,
but even in that case he has reversionary rights74 which consti-
tute a present estate in the property. The usual equitable remedy
should therefore be available to him.
Under the usual form of oil and gas lease there is likewise no
conveyance of the legal title in these products. The lessee has an
exclusive right to remove oil and gas if found,75 but this right
60 See Canal Co. v. Genet, 169 Pa. St. 343, 32 AtI. 559 (1895) ; Coolbaugh V.
Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company, 213 Pa. St. 28, 62 Atl. 94 (1906) ; and cases
collected in note to latter case in 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 207.
T McColl v. Bear Creek Coal Min. Co., 162 Ia. 491, 143 N. W. 532 (1913);
Shenandoah Land & Coal Co. v. Hise, 92 Va. 238, 23 S. E. 303 (1895) ; Bluestone
Coal Co. v. Bell, 38 W. Va. 297, 18 S. E. 493 (1893) ; Starn v. Huffman, 62 W. Va.
422, 59 S. E. 179 (1907) (dictum) ; Chandler v. French, 73 W. Va. 658, 81 S. E.
825 (1914) ; Loveland . Longberry, 45 *is. 60 (1901).
TLCommonwealth v. Pocahontas Coal Co., 107 Va. 666, 60 S. E. 84 (1907)
Harvey Coal & Coke Co. v. Dillon, 59 W. Va. 605, 53 S. E. 928 (1905) ; Comley v.
Ford, 65 W. Va. 429, 64 S. E. 447 (1909)
72Wilmore Coal Co. v. Brown, 147 Fed. 931, 153 Fed. 143 (1907) ; Browning V.
Boswell, 215 Fed. 826 (1914).
73Cowan v. Radford Ir. Co., 83 Va. 547, 3 S. E. 120 (1887) ; Starn V. Huffman,
62 W. Va. 422, 59 S. U. 179 (1907); Chandler v. French, 73 W. Va. 65, 81
S. E. 825 (1914).
74 See Comley v. Ford, 65 W. Va. 429, 64 S. E. 447 (1909).
7 Duke v. Hague, 107 Pa. St. 57 (1884) ; Urpman v. Lowther Oil Co., 53 W. Va.
501, 505, 44 S. E. 433 (1903).
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becomes vested only upon the discovery of these minerals 7 6 or
their discovery in paying quantities.7 7  There seems to be a divi-
sion in the authorities as to whether this right even after the dis-
covery of oil or gas is corporeal78 or .incorporeal. 79  Although a
lessee possesses a lesser interest, his right after the discovery of
oil would seem analogous to that of an owner of these minerals
when severed from the surface. But an oil and gas lease also gives
the lessee a right to take possession of the property and carry on
explorations for oil and gas by drilling or by other means. What-
ever the nature of the lessee's right in the oil and gas this right
to possession is a vested estate analogous to the interest of a lessee
of coal or ore property. It may be taxed separately from the
interest of the lessor, 0 and is in other respects treated as a chattel
real. It follows that the lessee of oil and gas property either be-
fore8 ' or after 82 the discovery of these products has an interest in
land sufficient to sustain a bill to remove cloud. The lessor, like-
wise, has a substantial interest in the property. Prior to the dis-
covery of oil and gas he possesses title in these minerals subject
to the limitations resulting from their fugitive nature. After dis-
covery of oil and gas the right of the lessee to these minerals be-
comes a vested one within the limits prescribed by the lease. At
all times, however, the lessor retains some interest in the property
for the lease never conveys away the whole of his title, but gives
rights of exploration and removal only for a limited time or "for
as long as oil and gas are found in paying quantities." A lessee
might cease operations and abandon property which a higher
71 So. Penn 0il Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. 961 (1911).
7 Burgan v. So. Penn Oil Co., 243 Pa. St. 128, 89 Atl. 823 (1913); Parish Fork
0il Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583, 42 S. E. 655 (1902); Steelsmith iV.
Gartlan, 45 W. Va. 27, 29 S. E. 978 (1898). In Steelsmith v. Gartlan, supra, a
discovery of oil or gas, not in paying quantities, was held insufficient to give a vested
right in these products where the lessee had not explored further under the lease.
In South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, supra, the oil was not discovered In paying
quantities, but the lessee continued explorations for the mineral. It Is, of course,
possible that this distinction rather than the question of whether the oil or gas is
found in paying quantities, may determine the time at which the lessee's right to
the oil and gas becomes vested.
78 Hall v. Vernon, 47 W. Va. 295, 300, 34 S. E. 764 (1899).
79 Union Petroleum Co. v. Bliven Pet. Co., 72 Pa. St. 173 (1872).
8 Mound City Gas Co. v. Oil Co., 83 Kan. 136, 109 Pac. 1002 (1910) (dictum);
Mt. Sterling Oil & Gas Co. v. Ratlif, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1229, 104 S. W. 993 (1905)
Wolfe County v. Beckett, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 167, 105 S. W. 447 (1907) ; Harvey Coal
& Coke Co. v. Dillon, 59 W. Va. 605, 53 S. E. 928 (1905) (dictum).
81 Crawford v. Ritchey, 43 W. Va. 252, 27 S. E. 220 (1897).
82 Steelsmith v. Gartlan, 45 W. Va. 27, 29 S. E. 978 (1898) ; Urpman V. Lowther
Oil Co., 53 W. Va. 501, 44 S. E. 433 (1903) ; Castle Brook Carbon Co. '. Ferrell,
76 W. Va. 300, 85 S. E. 544 (1916).
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market price or new discoveries of oil or gas might render work-
able and valuable. This ultimate right of the lessor to oil and gas
not discovered or not removed is a legal interest which, it is sub-
mitted, is sufficient to support a bill to remove cloud. When a bill
is brought by a lessor before the discovery of oil and gas it is uni-
formly held that he has a sufficient title to maintain it. 3  When
the bill is brought after the discovery of oil or gas by the lessee
one West Virginia case has held that an assignee of the lessor has
not a sufficient interest to support a bill.84 This case seems clearly
erroneous and it was overruled on this point by a subsequent de-
cision,"' now supported by at least two other West Virginia cases. 8
Any person owning an equitable interest in a piece of property
has a substantial proprietary right which is injured by the ex-
istence of a cloud upon the title and on general equitable princi-
ples such a person should be allowed to maintain a bill to have it
removed. But on this point there is great divergence among the
authorities. It seems to be well settled that a cloud may be re-
moved as an incident to other relief given to enforce or protect an
equitable right.8 ' In cases in which there is no independent ground
of equity jurisdiction the federal courts and those of Virginia have
refused to allow the owner of a merely equitable interest to main-
tain a bill to remove cloud from title,88 and there are dicta and
one decision in West Virginia to the same effect. 9 This view has
been defended on the ground that the owner of the equitable right
may get in the legal title and then sue in ejectment 0 There are
8 Cooke v. Gulf Ref. Co., 135 La. 609, 65 So. 758 (1914) ; Fisher V. Crescent Oil
Co., 178 S. W. 905 (Tex. 1915).
84 Zinn v. Zinn, 54 W. Va. 483. 46 S. E. 202 (1904).
8Peterson v. Hall, 57 W. Va. 535, 50 S. E. 603 (1906).
66 Smith v. Linden Oil Co., 69 W. Va. 57, 71 S. E. 167 (1911) ; Jennings v. Carbon
Co., 73 W. Va. 215, 80 S. E. 368 (1913).
87 Swick v. Rease, 62 W. Va. 557, 59 S. E. 510 (1906) ; Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W.
Va. 483, 497, 61 S. D. 410 (1908) ; Custer v. Hall, 71 W. Va. 119, 76 S. E. 183
(1912).
8 Steed v. Baker, 13 Grat. 380 (Va. 1855) ; Glenn v. West, 103 Va. 521, 49 S. E.
671 (1905) ; Tax Title Co. v. Denoon, 107 Va. 201, 57 S. E. 586 (1907) ; Buchanan
v. Smith, 115 Va. 704 (1914) ; Frost v. Spitley, 121 U. S. 552 (1897). On the same
ground must be justified the Virginia cases denying a bill to remove cloud to a
plaintiff whose only right in property is a right to redeem from a sale for taxes.
Parsons v. Newman, 99 Va. 298, 38 S. E. 186 (1901) ; Baker v. Briggs, 99 Va. 360,
38 S. E. 277 (1901) ; Mathews v. Glenn, 100 Va. 352, 41 S. E. 735 (1902) ; though
the courts treat these as cases where the plaintiff has no interest in the property.
8ODavis v. Settle, 43 W. Va. 17, 26 S. E. 557 (1896) (dictum In dissenting
opinion) ; Swick v. Rease, 62 W. Va. 557, 59 S. E. 510 (1906) (dictum) ; Jones v.
Crim, 66 W. Va. 301, 66 S: E. 367 (1909).
00 Glenn v. West, 103 Va. 521, 49 S. E. 671 (1905) ; Hitchcox v. Morrison, 47
14
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several difficulties with such a theory. Many equitable rights do
not entitle the holder to a conveyance of the legal title, yet the
owner of such an interest should not be refused the only available
method of destroying claims adverse to his rights. Even though
an equitable right be one entitling the holder to a conveyance of
the legal title it does not follow that recovery of the title will
give him a right to maintain ejectment. If he recovers possession
as well as title he must still attack any adverse claim by a bill to re-
*move cloud and thus employ the remedy denied him in the first in-
stance. At all events the theory wholly disregards the fact that the
balance of convenience would clearly favor settling the whole con-
troversy in one proceeding.91 The injustice of, denying to the
owner of an equitable interest the right to maintain a bill to re-
move cloud is illustrated by the case of equitable rights given as
security. Under this rule if the obligation secured by an equitable
interest in property is due, the holder must either enforce his lien
at once (thus securing the removal of the cloud as an incident to
the enforcement of his lien) or he must run the risk that the pas-
sage of time will render the cloud more difficult to overcome.92 If
the debt secured by the equitable lien is not due there would ap-
pear to be no remedy whatever available if a bill to remove cloud
is denied. Elsewhere equitable rights support equitable remedies
and there seems to be no reason why an equitable interest should
not give its holder a right to remove a cloud from the property to
which the right attaches. In Virginia a statute passed in 1912
changes the rule established by prior decisions and permits the
holder of a purely equitable title to maintain a bill to remove
cloud,93 and several West Virginia decisions reach the same just
result in the absence of statute.9 In one of these cases the adverse
claim attacked as a cloud was that of a person holding the legal
title to the property. " It is submitted, however, that the result
W. Va. 206, 34 S. B. 993 (1901); Jones v. Crim. 66 W. Va. 301, 66 S. E. 367
(1909).
91 Morrison v. American Ass'n, 110 Va. 91, 65 S. E. 469 (1909) ; Swlck V. Rease,
62 W. Va. 557, 59 S. E. 510 (1907) ; Custer v. Hall, 71 W. Va. 119, 76 S. E. 183
(1912).
92Dudley v. Browning, 90 S. E. 878 (W. Va. 1916).
9'Acts of Va., 1912, 76; see Buchanan Co. v. Smith, 115 Va. 704, 80 S. E. 794
(1914).
9Knsports v. Rawson, 29 W. Va. 487, 2 S. E. 85, 36 W. Va. 237, 15 S. B. 66
(1892) ; Depue v. Miller, 65 W. Va. 120, 64 S. E. 740 (1909) ; Criner v,. Geary,
89 S. E. 149 (W. Va. 1916) (dictum) ; Dudley v. Browning, 90 S. E. 878 (W.
Va. 1916).
95 Depue v. Miller, 65 W. Va. 120, 64 S. E. 740 (1909).
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should be the same where the adverse interest is that of a third
person, and in two of these cases relief -was given against a party
claiming under an independent chain of title.9"
A person who has conveyed real estate, retaining no lien upon
the property, but covenanting to warrant and defend its title
obviously has no right in rem in the property conveyed. He is,
however, liable to make restitution for any injury which hiRq
grantees or their assigns may suffer by reason of a defect in the
title. This risk of loss, though contingent, is real and substantial,
and gives a warrantor of title a pecuniary interest in protecting
title to the property sufficient to support a bill to remove cloud.9'
The few eases holding that a warrantor of title may not maintain
a bill to remove cloud are rested upon the very technical ground
that such a person has no property right in the land conveyed."8
By the general rule pecuniary interests equally with proprietary
ones entitle a plaintiff to equitable relief,9" and on this ground, a
Warrantor of title should be allowed to bring a bill to remove
cloud. Two West Virginia cases support the weight of authority
in this view,100 a position hardly consistent With refusing to grant
a bill to remove cloud *to the holder of an equitable interest in
property.
III
The courts usually state that the second requirement of a bill
to remove cloud is that the plaintiff allege,"0" and prove"0 ' that
SoKinsports v. Rawson, 29 W. Va. 487, 2 S. E. 85, 36 W. Va. 237, 15 S. E. 68
(1892) ; Dudley v. Browning, 90 S. E. 878 (W. Va. 1916).
97 Chipman v. Hartford, 21 Conn. 488 (1852) ; U. S. Bank v. Cochran, 9 Dana 395
(Ky. 1840) ; Sutlif v. Smith, 58 Kan. 559, 50 Pac. 455 (1897) ; Begole V. Hershey.
86 Mich. 130, 48 N. W. 790 (1891) ; Styer v. Sprague, 63 Minn. 414, 65 N. W. 659
(1895) ; Jones v. Nixon, 102 Tenn. 95, 50 S. W. 740 (1898) ; Pier V. Fond du Lac.
53 Wis. 421, 10 N. W. 686 (1881) ; Remer v. Mackay, 35 Fed. 86 (1888).
"Glos v. Goodrich, 175 Ill. 20, 51 N. E. 643 (1898).
° Dixon v. Holden, 7 Eq. 487 (Eng. 1869); Walter v. Ashton, (1902) 2 Ch.
282; Shoemaker v. So. Bend Spark Arrestor Co., 135 Ind. 471, 35 N. E. 280
(1893) ; Gomphers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1913).
'w Jackson v. Kittle, 34 W. Va. 207, 12 S. E. 484 (1890) ; Dudley v. Browning,
90 S. B. 878 (W. Va. 1916) (dictum).
=1Kane v. Va. Coal & Iron Co., 97 Va. 329, 33 S. E. 627 (1899) ; Clayton v. Barr,
34 W. Va. 290, 12 S. E. 704 (1890) ; Christian v. Vance, 41 W. Va. 754, 24 S. B.
596 (1894) ; Sansom v. Blankenship, 53 W. Va. 411, 44 S. E. 408 (1903) ; Jackson
v. Cook. 71 W. Va. 210, 76 S. E. 443 (1912) (dictum) ; Grass v. Beard, 73 W. Va.
309, 80 S. E. 835 (1913) ; Horse Creek Land Co. -v. Trees, 75 W. Va. 559, 84 S. E.
376 (1914) ; Roberts v. Gruber, 74 W. Va. 550, 82 S. E. 367 (1914) ; Harmon v.
Lambert, 76 W. Va. 370, 85 S. E. 660 (1915).
=Kane V,. Va. Coal and Iron Co., 97 Va. 329, 33 S. B. 627 (1899) ; Otey V.
Stuart, 91 Va. 714, 22 S. E. 513 (1895) ; Steinman v. Vicars, 99 Va. 595. 39 S. E.
227 (1901) ; Smith v. Thomas, 99 Va. 86, 37 S. E. 784 (1901) ; McConnell v.
16
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be is in possession of the property. It is true that a person out
of possession usually has an adequate legal remedy, and for that
reason cannot maintain a bill to remove cloud,103 and since a
plaintiff in possession cannot bring ejectment he is always entitled
to equitable relief, but it does not follow that a plaintiff not in
possession is never allowed to bring a bill to remove cloud. If he
is without an adequate legal remedy his right to such relief is as
great as that of a person in possession. More accurately stated,
therefore, the second requirement of a bill to remove cloud from
title is that there be no adequate legal remedy by which title can
be cleared. 0 4 In the state courts the scope of tlie jurisdiction is
even broader since if the legal remedy was at a prior time inade-
quate and equity then took jurisdiction that jurisdiction is retained
even though the legal remedy has now been made adequate.105 But
in the federal courts jurisdiction is strictly limited to cases where
the legal remedy is at present inadequate. Section 267 of the
Judicial Code restricts the chancery jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States to cases where there is no plain, adequate and
complete remedy at law, 1 6 and as a result equity loses its juris-
diction to remove cloud from title as rapidly as common law ac-
tions become available.10
7
In a majority of cases the existence of an adequate legal remedy
depends upon whether or not the-plaintiff in a bill to remove
Rowland, 48 W. Va. 276, 37 S. E. 586 (1900) ; Hitchcox v,. Morrison, 47 W. Va.
206, 34 S. E. 993 (1901); Logan v. Ward, 58 W. Va. 366, 52 S. E. 398 (1906);
Mills v. Henry Oil Co., 57 W. Va. 255, 50 S. B. 157 (1906); Poling V. Poling,
61 W. Va. 78, 55 S. E.993 (1907) ; Earle v. Keenan, 68 W Va. 732, 70 S. E. 753
(1911) ; Mustard v. Big Creek Dev. Co., 69 W. Va. 713, 72 S. E. 1021 (1911)
(dictum) ; Custer v. Hall, 71 W. Va. 119 (1912) ; Grass v. Beard, 73 W. Va. 309,
80 S. D. 835 (1913); Beatty v. Edgell, 75 W. Va. 252, 83 S. E. 903 (1914); Big
Huff Coal Co. v. Thomas, 76 W. Va. 161, 85 S. E. 171 (1915) ; Taylor v. Taylor,
76 W. Va. 469, 85 S. E. 652 (1915) (dictum) ; contra: De Camp v. Carnahan, 26
W. Va. 839 (1885), overruled by Moore v. McNutt, 41 W. Va. 695, 24 S. F. 682
(1896).
103 Lange v. Jones, 5 Leigh 192 (Va. 1834); Glenn v. West, 103 Va. 521, 49 S.
E. 671 (1905) ; Beatty v. Edgell, 75 W. Va. 252, 83 S. E. 903 (1914)..
IN Lange v. Jones, 5 Leigh 192 (Va. 1834) ; Stearns v. Harman, 80 Va. 48
(1885) ; Otey v. Stuart, 91 Va. 714, 22 S. E. 513 (1895) ; Sulphur Mines Co. v.
Boswell, 94 Va. 480. 27 S. E. 24 (1897); S. & W. R. Co. v. Va. & S. W. R. Co., 104
Va. 323, 51 S. E. 843 (1905) ; Austin V. Minor, 107 Va. 101, 57 S. E. 609 (1907) ;
Clayton v. Barr, 34 W. Va. 290, 12 S. E. 704 (1890) ; Moore v. McNutt, 41 W. Va.
695, 24 S. E. 682 (1895).
1 4 MINOR, INSTITuTES, 3 ed., 1333; Stelnman v. Vicars, 99 Va. 595, 39 S. E. 227
(1901) ; Moore v. McNutt, 41 W. Va. 695, 24 S. E. 682 (1895) ; Sansom V. Blanken-
ship, 53 W. Va. 411, 44 S. E. 408 (1903) ; Whitehouse -v. Jones, 60 W. Va. 680, 55
.5. E. 730 (1907).
106R. S. § 709; U. S. Comp. Ste. § 1244.
10 Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 373 (U. S. 1872).
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cloud is in a position to bring ejectment. As has been seen the
common-law action of ejectment was purely possessory and could
only be brought by a plaintiff out of possession, or in possession
of a part of the property only and suing to recover a portion
from which he had been disseised 0 8  A plaintiff in actual pos-
session of property could not maintain ejectment against a de-
fendant who had not disseised the plaintiff but was making claims
of title.10 9 This became, therefore, the typical case in which equity
assumed jurisdiction to remove cloud from title.1 0  The scope of
the action of ejeetment has been much enlarged in both Virginia
and West Virginia but these statutory changes seem not to have
made the action available to a plaintiff in undisturbed 'possession
of his property. This has been specifically decided in Virginia."'
There are dicta to the effect that Acts of W. Va., 1877, ch. 110,
§ 5, allows a plaintiff in possession to bring ejeetment," 2 but the
phraseology of the statute would seem to limit the right to sue an
adverse claimant to cases where the property is unoccupied or
occupied by some other defendant in the suit." s  It is clear that
the legal remedy was at one time inadequate and equity then took
jurisdiction. Whatever may be the present rule as to ejectment
it is settled that equity has retained this jurisdiction and a plaintiff
in actual possession of property is entitled to maintain a
bill to remove cloud. 1 4  Possession by a tenant,"3  or co-ten-
ant 16 is sufficient. The motive for taking possession is immaterial
'os Tapscott v. Cobbs, 11 Grat. 172 (Va. 1854); Logan v. Ward, 58 W. Va. 366,
52 S. E. 398 (1906).
109 Carroll v. Brown, 28 Grat. 791 (Va. 1887); Steinman v. Vicars, 99 Va. 595
(1901) ; Moore v. McNutt, 41 W. Va. 695, 24 S. E. 682 (1896).
no Jones v. Neales, 2 Pat & H. 339 (Va. 1856); Va. Coal & Iron Co. v. Kelley,
93 Va. 332, 24 S. E. 1020 (1896) ; McNemara Synd. v. Boyd, 112 Va. 145, 70 S. E.
694 (1911) ; Moore v. McNutt, 41 W. Va. 695 (1895) ; Smith v. O'Keefe, 43 W. Va.
172, 27 S. E. 353 (1896) ; Carberry v. W. Va. & P. R. Co., 44 W. Va. 260, 28
S. E. 694 (1897) (dictum) ; Waldron v. Harvey, 54 W. Va. 608, 46 S. E. 603
(1904) ; Iguano Co. v. Jones, 65 W. Va. 59, 64 S. E. 640 (1909); Perry V. Mc-
Donald, 69 W. Va. 619, 72 S. D. 745 (1911) ; Castle Brook Carbon Co. v. Ferrell,
85 S. E. 544 (W. Va. 1915) ; Bradley v. Swope, 87 S. E. 86 (W. Va. 1915).
U1 Steinman v. Vicars, 99 Va. 595, 39 S. E. 227 (1901) ; Neff v. Ryman, 100 Va.
521, 42 S. E. 314 (1902).
nu Postlewaite v. Wise, 17 W. Va. 1 (1880) ; Moore v. McNutt, 41 W. Va. 695, 24
S. E. 682 (1895).
2" Code of W. Va., 1913, c. 90, § 5.
11 Steinman v. Vicars, 99 Va. 595, 39 S. E. 227 (1901); Moore v. McNutt, 41
W. Va. 695, 24 S. E. 682 (1895) ; Sansom v. Blankenship, 53 W. Va. 411, 44 S. E.
408 (1903) ; Whitehouse v. Jones, 60 W. Va. 680, 55 S. U. 730 (1907).
wU Tax Title Co. v. Denoon, 107 Va. 201, 57 S. E. 586 (1907) ; Mackey v. Maxin,
63 W. Va. 14, 59 S. E. 742 (1907).
M Davis v. Settle, 43 W. Va. 17, 26 S. E. 557 (1897).
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and a plaintiff may acquire possession of unoccupied property for
this very purpose.117  The possession must, however, be rightfully
acquired; if possession is taken by ejecting another,'1 8 or by
inducing the tenants of another to attorn to the plaintiff,"l9 these.
acts bar the right of the plaintiff to claim relief in equity.
At common law a plaintiff could not maintain ejeetment if
neither he nor the defendant was in possession of the property.
If the premises were wholly unoccupied the plaintiff, as owner of the
property, held constructive possession and had no legal remedy
against a person who had not entered upon the property. 20 A
fortiori if the property were occupied by a third person the owner
was not able to bring ejeetment against a mere claimant to the
title. Equity was the only source of relief and took jurisdiction to
remove cloud from title.' In Virginia the scope of the action of
ejectment was enlarged by Code of Va., 1849,' ch. 135, § 5,
which provided that if the premises were unoccupied any person
"claiming title thereto or some interest therein" might be made
defendant. This provision was adopted by Code of W. Va.,
1868, ch. 90, § 5, and is still in force in both states.' 2 ' The effect
of these statutes is to permit an action in ejectment where neither
the defendant nor plaintiff is in possession and though the defend-
ant has never entered upon the property. It by no means follows
that equity has lost its power to remove cloud from title under
these circumstances. The familiar principle that equity having
once taken jurisdiction never loses it (except under the specific-
terms of the federal statute) is applicable, and in Virginia it has
been held that equity will cancel a cloud upon title in such a
n7 Perry v. McDonald, 69 W. Va- 619, 72 S. E. 745 (1911).
'Is Perry v. McDonald, 69 W. Va. 619, 72 S. E. 745 (1911) (dictum).
119 Meade v. King, 111 Va. 283, 68 S. E. 997 (1910) ; Harmon v. Lambert, 76 W..
Va. 370, 85 S. E. 660 (1915).
Io Harrington v. Port Huron, 86 Mich. 46, 48 N. W. 641 (1891).
M'Mathews v. Marks, 44 Ark. 436 (1884); Graham v. Florida Co., 33 Fla. 356,
14 So. 796 (1894) ; Glos v. Beckman, 183 Il. 158, 55 N. E. 636 (1894) ; Dodd v.
Cook, 11 Gray 495 (Mass. 1858); Palmer v. Yorks, 77 Minn. 20, 79 N. W. 587'
(1898) ; Eayrs v. Nason, 54 Neb. 143, 74 N. W. 408 (1898); Low v. Staples, 2
Nev. 209 (1865); Davenport v. Stephens, 95 Wis. 456. 70 N. W. 661 (1897)
Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15 (1883).
112 Code of Va., 1904, § 2726; Code of W. Va., 1913, c. 90, § 5. See Stearns
v. Harman, 80 Va. 48 (1885) ; Mackey v. Maxin, 63 W. Va. 14, 59 S. E. 742 (1907) ;
Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328 (U. S. 1864). The remedy by ejectment was further-
extended by Acts of W. Va., 1877, c. 110, § 5, which provided that it might be
brought against a mere claimant to the title where the property was occupied by a
third person. A statute similar in effect was passed in Virginia in 1895. ACTS Or
Va., 1895-96, 514, now Code of Va., 1904, § 2726. The West Virginia statute is.
now found in Code of W. Va., 1913, c. 90, § 5.
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case. 23 In West Virginia the courts seem to have lost sight of this
principle. An allegation of possession will be construed to imply
actual possession,12' but a majority of the cases hold that, if the
bill or proof shows that the plaintiff's possession is only construc-
tive, relief by bill to remove cloud will be refused. 25 No cases seem
to have arisen where a third party was in possession of the prop-
erty but there is a dictum holding that relief will also be denied
in such a case. 28 Since equity had jurisdiction to remove cloud
from title before the legal remedy became adequate these decisions
seem erroneous. They can only be supported on the ground that
such a jurisdiction was never exercised in Virginia prior to the
enactment of the Code of 1849, and that since that time the legal
remedy has been adequate. The difficulty with this theory is that
the absence of a decision would not mean the absence of jurisdic-
tion to remove cloud from title. Such jurisdiction would be in-
herent in the chancery courts of Virginia and therefore possessed
by the courts of West Virginia. The doctrine of the Virginia
courts granting relief by bill to remove cloud where neither the
plaintiff nor defendant is in possession of the property is in har-
mony with the established rule in other jurisdictions, 2 ' while the
West Virginia cases are not followed elsewhere.
Special problems as to possession arise in cases involving mineral
rights. When title to the surface and title to the minerals have
not been separated, possession of the surface is possession of the
minerals underlying it.2 ' But after separation of the minerals
from the surface each is subject to a separate possession, and
possession of the surface does not carry with it possession of the
McNemara v. Boyd, 112 Va. 145, 70 S. E. 694 (1911) ; contra: Stearns v. Har-
man, 80 Va. 48 (1885) ; and see Austin v. Minor, 107 Va. 101, 57 S. . 609 (1907).
'" Sansom v. Blankenship, 53 W. Va. 411, 44 S. E. 408 (1903) ; Simmons Creek
Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417 (1891).
=-Moore v. McNutt, 41 W. Va. 695, 24 S. D. 682 (1895) (dictum); Hitchcox
v. Morrison, 47 W. Va. 206, 34 S. E. 993 (1900) ; Whitehouse V. Jones, 60 W. Va.
680, 55 S. D. 730 (1907) ; Mackey v. Maxin, 63 W. Va. 14, 59 S. E. 742 (1907);
Horse Creek Land Co. v. Trees, 75 W. Va. 559, 84 S. E. 376 (1914) (dictum);
Big Huff Coal Company v. Thomas, 76 W. Va. 161, 85 S. U. 171 (1915) ; contra:
Smith v. O'Keefe, 43 W. Va. 172, 27 S. E. 353 (1896) (dictum) ; Carberry v. West
Virginia Co., 44 W. Va. 260, 28 S. E. 694 ('1897).
= Moore v. McNutt, 41 W. Va. 695, 24 S. B. 682 (1895) (dictum).
=See cases under note 121, supra.
USHoilman v. Johnson, 164 N. C. 268, 80 S. E. 249 (1913); Morrison v. Am.
Association, 110 Va. 91, 65 S. E. 469 (1909); Preston v. White, 57 W. Va. 278,
50 S. E. 236 (1905) (dictum) ; Mackey v. Maxin, 63 W. Va. 14, 59 S. E. 742 (1908)
(dictum).
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coal, 1 2 9 or the oil and gas underlying it."' When, therefore, title
to coal or ore has been separated from title to the surface by an
absolute grant it is possible to take possession of the coal or ore,
apart from possession of the surface, by mining and removing
these minerals. 1' Likewise, when coal or ore property has been
leased for mining purposes the lessee may, for the purpose of re-
moving these minerals, take a possession of the property inde-
pendent of the possession of the owner of the surface." 2 The same
situations exist in the case of oil or gas. When these minerals
have been separated from the surface by an absolute grant the
grantee may take possession of the property for the purpose of
drilling for these products, and when a lease has been executed
the lessee of oil and gas property may take possession for the
purpose of searching for these products and removing them if
found, while the lessor remains possessed of the surface for other
purposes. 3 3 As regards the possession of the lessee under an oil
and gas lease the question of whether oil and gas have been dis-
covered would seem immaterial. The right of exploration exists
in any event and if explorations are actually being carried on the
lessee may properly be said to be in possession. Of course if the
lessee has never prospected upon the property possession of the
whole remains in the lessor."4
In the case of mineral interests, as with other property, a person
in possession is without any adequate legal remedy against an ad-
verse claimant and therefore entitled to bring a bill to remove
cloud. Thus when title to the surface has not been separated from
title to the minerals a person in possession of the surface, and
therefore of the minerals, can bring a bill to remove cloud from
19 Morrison v. Am. Association, 110 Va. 91, 65 S. E. 469 (1909) ; Wallace V. Elm
Grove Coal Co., 58 W. Va. 449 (1906) ; but see Virginia Ir. Co. v. Kelley, 93 Va. 332
(1897), where after separation of the minerals from the surface a plaintiff in pos-
session of the surface, but claiming both surface and minerals, was allowed to main-
tain a bill to remove cloud from the minerals.
=
5 Moore v. Griffin, 72 Kan. 164, 83 Pac. 395 (1905) ; D. & H. Canal Co. v.
Hughes, 183 Pa. St. 66, 38 Atl. 568 (1897); Murray v. Allred, 100 Tenn. 100, 43
S. W. 355 (1897).
=Virginia Ir. Co. v. Kelley, 93 Va. 332, 24 S. E. 1020 (1897) ; Morrison v. Am.
Association, 110 Va. 91, 65 S. E. 469 (1909) ; Wallace v. Elm Grove Coal Co., 58
W. Va. 449, 52 S. E. 485 (1906).
=1Howell v. Cuyuna No. R. Co., 127 Minn. 480, 149 N. W. 942 (1915) ; Browning
v. Boswell, 215 Fed. 826 (1914).
=Westmoreland Gas Co. v. De Witt, 130 Pa. St. 235, 255, 18 AtI. 724 (1889);
Kellar v. Craig, 126 Fed. 630 (1903).
" Crawford v. Ritchey, 43 W. Va. 252, 27 S. E. 220 (1897).
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either the surface or the minerals. 13 5^ So, also, a person in pos-
session of the coal or ore underlying a tract of land, whether as
grantee of the mineral interests or as lessee, is without legal
remedy and can secure relief against an adverse claim only by a
bill to remove cloud."8' And a grantee of oil and gas or a lessee
of oil and gas property, if in possession, is without legal remedy
and therefore allowed to bring a bill to remove cloud.1' 7  Diffi-
culties arise only in those cases in which a plaintiff not in posses-
sion seeks to bring a bill to remove cloud. Here a fiat rule that
only persons in possession of property can bring a bill to remove
cloud would work the greatest injustice. The owner of coal or ore
strata or the lessee of coal or ore property which has been oc-
cupied by an adverse claimant has a legal remedy by ejectment"3
and no need of a bill to remove cloud. Likewise, when not in
possession, a grantee of oil and gas or any other person whose
interest is construed to be actual ownership of these minerals has
a right to bring ejectment and no need of the equitable remedy.'3 9
The legal rights of a lessee of oil and gas property are much less
clear. It has been held in West Virginia that such a lessee may
bring an action of unlawful detainer to obtain possession of prop-
erty,14 0 but since this action is inconclusive as to title and does not
bar future actions,'41 it is not an adequate protection of the lessee's
rights. A few Pennsylvania cases have permitted thd lessee of
oil and gas property to bring ejectment,142 but these have been
cases where the lease was construed to be in substance a conveyance
of the oil and gas, and other decisions of the same court have held
=Steinman v. Vicars, 99 Va. 595, 39 S. E. 227 (1901); Golden Cycle Min. Co.
v. Christmas Gold Min. Co., 204 Fed. 939 (1913).
'm Wilmore Coal Company v. Brown, 147 Fed. 931, 153 Fed. 143 (1907) ; Brown-
ing v. Boswell, 215 Fed. 826 (1914).
= Steelsmith v. Gartlan, 45 W. Va. 27, 29 S. E. 978 (1898) ; Urpman v. Lowther
Oil Co., 53 W. Va. 501, 44 S. E. 433 (1903); McGraw Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 65 W.
Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027 (1909).
= Moragne v. Doe, 143 Ala. 459, 39 So. 161 (1905) ; Beatty v. Gregory, 17 Ia.
109 (1864) ; Gordon v. Park, 202 Mo. 236, 100 S. W. 621 (1907) ; Wilson V. Triumph
Consol. Min. Co., 19 Utah 66, 56 Pac. 300 (1899).
239Long's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 171 (1879) ; Messimer's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 168
(1879) ; Williams v. Fowler, 201 Pa. St. 336, 50 Atl. 969 (1902) ; Barnsdall v. Brad-
ford Gas Co., 225 Pa. St. 338, 74 Atl. 207 (1909) ; Garrett v. Oil Co., 66 W. Va.
587, 66 S. D. 741 (lessee and grantee of 1/16 of oil and 1/2 of gas).
"'0Guffy v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 49, 11 S. E. 754 (1890); Schaupp v. Hukill, 34
W. Va. 375, 12 S. E. 501 (1890) ; Thomas v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 385, 12 S. E. 522
(1890).
I' Code of W. Va., 1913, c. 89, § 4.
24 Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. St. 338, 74 Atl. 207 (1909) and cases
cited therein.
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that when an oil and gas lease passes no. title to these products the
lessee cannot bring ejectment.14" The right of a lessee of oil and
gas property to bring ejectment seems never to have been directly
passed upon by the courts of Virginia or West Virginia,1" but it
has been held that such a lessee may bring a bill to remove cloud
from his interest though not in possession of the property.
45 If
ejectment is not maintainable by such a lessee this is obviously a
necessary ruling -if the lessee is not to be deprived of all means
for protecting his rights. There is an even more striking need for
an equitable remedy for the protection of the interest of a lessor
of mineral property. Even when out of possession a lessor of coal
or ore property or of oil and gas interests has no right to bring
ejectment. Yet an adverse claim may obviously injure the market
value of the lessor's rights and for this reason he is permitted to
bring a bill to temove cloud.186
Remaindermen, owners of purely equitable interests, persons
holding property as security, and vendors bound by a warranty of
title are not ordinarily in possession of the property in which they
have an interest. Yet none of these parties can bring ejectment.
The legal rights of a remainderman extend only to the protection of
the inheritance from injury, and in the absence of such injury he
has no legal rights against a claimant to the property even though
the latter has entered the premises. 14 7 Even when the inheritance
is injured his action is trespass on the case and of no effect in
establishing title. So, also, the owner of a merely equitable title
cannot ordinarily bring ejectment.' An exception to this rule
exists in the case of the cestui que trust of a dry trust who is al-
lowed an action of ejectment,'" but only as a short cut to secure
an equitable right. The. existence of the legal remedy does not
cut off or limit the cestui's right to equitable relief. 50 In other
1 Union Co. v. Bliven Co., 72 Pa. St. 173 (1872); Duffleld v. Hue, 129 Pa. St. 94,
18 Atl. 566 (1889) ; Duffield v. Hue, 136 Pa. St. 602, 20 At. 526 (1890) ; Priddy
v. Thompson, 204 Fed. 955 (1913).
'"There is a dictum in Wilson v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826, 834, 28 S. E. 781 (1896),
to the effect that a lessee of oil and gas property may maintain ejeetment; see
also Garrett v. Oil Co., 66 W. Va. 587, 66 S. E. 741 (1911).
"'McGraw Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. D. 1027 (1909).
U$ Peterson v. Hall, 57 W. Va. 535, 50 S. E. 603 (1906) ; Jennings v. Carbon Co.,
73 W. Va. 215, 80 S. E. 368 (1913) - contra: Zinn v. Zinn, 54 W. Va. 483, 46 S. E.
202 (1904), overruled by Peterson v. Hall, 8upra.
"A Cherry v. Lake Drummond Can. Co., 140 N. C. 422, 53 S. E. 138 (1906).
148 Suttle v. Railroad Co., 76 Va. 284 (1882) ; Depue v. Miller, 65 W. Va. 120, 64
S. E. 740 (1909).
"4 Hopkins v. Ward, 6 Munf. 38 (Va. 1817).
"wBlake b. O'Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 61 S. E. 410 (1908).
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4ases the owner of a purely equitable interest has no legal remedy
whatever against an adverse claimant to the property. His only
relief is in equity, and if denied a remedy there on the ground
that he is not in possession of the property he would in many
instances be wholly unable to protect his property rights. Per-
sons holding property merely as security are similiarly without
means of protecting the title by legal action. In case it becomes
necessary to sell property under the terms of a mortgage or deed
of trust equity alone can clear the title so as to enable the person
making the sale to secure a fair price for the property.' 5' The
warrantor of title, likewise, has no right to possession of the prop-
erty and no legal remedy by which he can protect it. To deprive
these persons of the right to bring a bill to remove cloud from
title because they have no possession of the property would be the
grossest injustice. It would also be contrary to the rule that
equity will grant a bill to remove cloud upon title in any case in
which there is no adequate legal remedy. The cases very properly
hold, therefore, that a bill to remove cloud can be maintained by
a reversioner, 5 2 by the owner of a purely equitable interest,'5 3 by
a person holding property as security, 4 or a vendor bound by a
warranty, 15  without proof of possession in the plaintiff. The
holder of an easement would seem to be in the same situation. An
easement is a purely incorporeal right, not subject to possession,
and which will not sustain an action of ejectment. The owner of
an easement should therefore be permitted to bring a bill to remove
a cloud upon his interest, and such relief has been granted in at
least one instance. 5
In West Virginia an anomolous doctrine has arisen as to tax
deeds. An invalid tax deed issued by the State obviously creates
a cloud upon title which equity has jurisdiction to remove pro-
vided only there is no adequate legal remedy available. When the
=- Dudley v. Browning, 90 S. E. 878 (W. Va. 1916).
=r'Alexander v. Davis, 42 W. Va. 465, 26 S. E. 291 (1896) Depue v. Miller,
65 W. Va. 120, 64 S. E. 740 (1909).
'5 Acts of Va., 1912, 76; see Buchanan Co. v. Smith, 115 Va. 704, 80 S. E. 794
(1914) ; Kinsports v. Rawson, 36 W. Va. 237 (1892) ; Depue . Miller, 65 W. Va.
120, 64 S. E. 740 (1909) ; Dudley v. Browning, 90 S. E. 878 (W. Va. 1916).
I" Glenn v. Augusta, etc. Co., 99 Va. 695, 40 S. E. 525 (1901); Burlew V. Quar-
rier, 16 W. Va. 108 (1880) (point not relied upon by defendant); Danser V. John-
sons, 25 IV. Va. 380 (1884).
' Jackson v. KWttle, 34 W. Va. 207, 12 S. H. 484 (1890) ; Dudley v. Browning,
90 S. E. 878 (W. Va. 1916) (dictum) ; and see- Hitchcox: v. Hitchcox, 39 W. Va.
"07, 20 S. E. 595 (1894).
=Town of Weston v. Ralston, 48 W. Va. 170, 194, 36 S. E. 446 (1899).
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plaintiff seeking to attack a tax deed is himself in possession of
the property he cannot bring ejectment and his right to a bill to.
remove cloud is unquestioned. 157  If, however, the property has
been occupied by the grantee under the tax deed he can be ousted
by legal process and it would seem that there is no ground for giv-
ing equitable relief. In Virginia, therefore, a bill to remove cloud
from title cannot be sustained in such a case,51 s but in West Vir-
ginia the cases have uniformly held that a tax deed may be re-
moved as a cloud upon title even though the claimant under the
tax deed is in possession and there is an adequate remedy at law,15e
and these decisions have been held binding in the federal courts. 60
Some of the more recent decisions admit that these cases cannot
be sustained on principle as bills to remove cloud,' and one sug-
gests that the rule originated early in the history of the state
when there were large areas of wild and uninhabited land upon
which clouds could easily be created and which justified the courts
in giving a special protection to the owner of the legal title 16'
Although these cases as to tax deeds cannot be supported when
viewed as bills to remove cloud, some of them can be sustained upon
other grounds. Code of W. Va., ch. 31, § 27, which has been in
force since 1866,18s provides that if real estate has been sold for
taxes and the owner, or his heirs or assigns, claim that the taxes
on account of which the sale was made were not in arrears, they
may, within five years, bring a proceeding in equity to have the
tax deed set aside. This equitable relief is not conditioned upon
the inadequacy of the legal remedy and the statute therefore
justifies the result reached in several of the West Virginia cases,
though it seems to have been specifically relied upon in only one.8 4
=Carroll v. Brown, 28 Grat. 791 (Va. 1877); Glenn v. Brown, 99 Va. 322, 38
S. D. 189 (1899) ; Whitehouse v. Jones, 60 W. Va. 680, 55 S. E. 730 (1906).
us Carroll v). Brown, 28 Grat. 791 (Va. 1877) (dictum) ; Glenn v. West, 103 Va.
521, 49 S. D. 671 (1905). In Hale v. Penn, 25 Grat. 261 (Va. 1874), there was
nothing to show that the plaintiff was in possession but it is stated in Carroll v.
Brown, supra, that such was the case.
15 Orr v. Wiley, 19 W. Va. 150 (1881) (nothing to show who was in possession);
Simpson v. Edmiston, 23 W. Va. 675 (1884); Clayton v. Barr, 34 W. Va. 290,
12 S. E. 704 (1890) (dictum) ; Whitehouse v. Jones, 60 W. Va. 680, 55 S. E. 730
(1906) (dictum) ; but see Lawson v. Coal Land Co., 73 W. Va. 296, 81 S. B.
,583 (1913).
100Harding -. Guice, 80 Fed. 162 (1897) ; Sayers v. Burkhardt, 85 Fed. 248
(1898) ; Rich v. Braxton, 158 U. S. 375 (1895).
IL, Judge Brannon in Whitehouse v. Jones, 60 W. Va. 680, 687, 55 S. B. 730 (1906).
162Hardlng v. Guice, 80 Fed. 162 (1897).
'1 Acts of W. Va., 1866, c. 90, § 27.
'"Jones v. Dils, 1 W. Va. 759 (1881).
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BILLS TO BEMO 7 CLOUD FBOM TITLE 29
Two of these tax-deed cases, decided in the federal courts, may
be justified on the theory that they permit a plaintiff to maintain.
a bill to remove cloud when neither the plaintiff nor defendant is
in possession of the property,1 65 but though this theory is sup-
ported by the weight of authority elsewhere it is at variance with
the general rule in West Virginia."" The remaining cases involv-
ing tax deeds cannot be supported on principle. They must be re-
garded as setting forth an anomolous doctrine applicable only to
this special form of instrument.16 7
[To B. COmMUED]
2 See note 126, supra.
' Harding v. Gulce, 80 Ped. 162 (1897) Rich . Braxton, 158 U. S. 375 (1895).
1 Orr v. Wiley, 19 W. Va. 150 (1882); Simpson v. Edmiston, 23 W. Va. 67"
(1887) (apparently defendant in possession); Clayton v. Barr, 34 W. Vi. 290 (1890)
(dictum) ; Christian v. Vance, 41 W. Va. 754, 24 S. E. 596 (1895) (dictum):
Whitebouse v. Jones, 60 W. Va. 680, 55 S. E. 730 (1906) (dictum).
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